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THE 1975 AMENDMENTS TO THE MINNESOTA RULES
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By
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DANFORTH t

The Minnesota rules of discovery were amended as of January
1, 1975. In this Article ProfessorDanforth discusses the amendments, placing special emphasis on the amendments to Rule 26,
which now governs generally all discovery devices, and Rule 30,
which governs oral depositions.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1970, the discovery provisions contained in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were amended.' To a large extent, these
changes were reflected five years later in the 1975 amendments
to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts.2
Because the changes in Minnesota became effective January 1,
1975, 3 the language of the discovery rules is not new. Yet many
new isues have been created by the 1975 amendments which have
not been judicially resolved. There is little Minnesota case law on
the 1975 amendments. Federal decisions, which often are relevant
because of the similarity between the federal and Minnesota
rules, are also scarce and oftentimes conflicting.
The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it will set forth an
overview of the changes in the discovery rules. 4 Second, and more
importantly, this Article will examine Rules 261 and 306 in detail.
Rule 26 governs all discovery devices and Rule 30 governs oral
depositions.
H. AN OVERVIEW OF THE 1975 AMENDMENTS
The 1975 amendments to the discovery rules reflect organizational as well as substantive changes. The rules were rearranged
to create one rule which would govern discovery devices in general.' Thus old Rule 26, which dealt exclusively with depositions,
was converted into a rule of general applicability which prescribes
1. See 398 U.S. 979 (1970).
2. Compare id. with Order Prescribing and Promulgating Amended Rules of Civil Procedure for District Courts and Municipal Courts, 300 Minn. ix (1974).
3. Order Prescribing and Promulgating Amended Rules of Civil Procedure for District
Courts and Municipal Courts, 300 Minn. ix (1974).
4. See notes 7-117 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 118-96 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 197-266 infra and accompanying text.
7. MINN. R. CIv. P., Advisory Comm. Note-1975, Introduction.
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the methods,' scope,9 limitations,'0 timing," and supplemental
responses' 2 of discovery. Many of the old Rule 26 provisions for
depositions were then transferred to Rules 30, 31, and 32.13
The 1975 amendments also reflect substantive changes in the
rules governing discovery. Because many of the major changes
appear in Rules 26 and 30, they will be discussd in detail.'4 Preceding this discussion, however, is an overview of the substantive
changes in the other discovery rules.
A.

Rule 29: Stipulations RegardingDiscovery Procedure

Old Rule 29 permitted the parties to change by stipulation only
the procedures for taking depositions. 15 Rule 29 now permits stipulations modifying the procedures for any discovery device.16 The
stipulation does not require court approval. It is not subject to
disapproval by the court, except to the extent a protective order
may be obtained. Presumably the parties cannot stipulate to the
scope of discovery or the sanctions for failure to make discovery
because Rule 29 speaks only in terms of stipulating to
"procedure."'"
B.

Rule 31: Depositions of Witnesses on Written Questions

Rule 31 deals with depositions of a party' 8 or witness upon
8. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.01 (1977).
9. See id. 26.02. See notes 125-67 infra and accompanying text.
10. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.03 (1977). See notes 168-76 infra and accompanying text.
Rule 26.03 was derived from Dist. Ct. R. 30.02, 278 Minn. at app. 39 (1968).
11. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.04 (1977). See notes 177-80 infra and accompanying text.
12. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.05 (1977). See notes 181-96 infra and accompanying text.
13. This-resulted in the following rearrangement: (1) Dist. Ct. R. 26.01, 278 Minn. at
app. 32 (1968) (when depositions may be taken) was transferred to new Rule 30.01; (2)
Dist. Ct. R. 26.03, 278 Minn. at app. 33 (1968) (examination and cross-examination in
depositions) was transferred to new Rule 30.03; (3) Dist. Ct. R. 26.04, 278 Minn. at app.
33-34 (1968) (use of depositions) was transferred to new Rule 32.01; (4) Dist. Ct. R. 26.05,
278 Minn. at app. 34 (1968) (objections to the admissibility of depositions) was transferred
to new Rule 32.02; and (5) Dist. Ct. R. 26.06, 278 Minn. at app. 34-35 (1968) (effect of
taking or using depositions) was transferred to new Rule 32.03.
14. See notes 118-266 infra and accompanying text.
15. See Dist. Ct. R. 29, 278 Minn. at app. 38 (1968).
16. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 29 (1977).
17. See id.
18. Because the title of Rule 31 refers only to witnesses, some controversy has arisen
concerning whether a party to the lawsuit is to be included in the provisions of the rule.
Federal case law has generally determined, however, that the plain language of Rule 31
does apply to any person, including a party. See, e.g., Smith v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
22 F.R.D. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1977

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 2
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

written questions. Most provisions have not been changed.' 9
There are, however, five minor changes in Rule 31. First, the
language of the rule has been changed from depositions upon
written "interrogatories"
to depositions upon written
"questions." 2 0 This change eliminates confusion between Rule 33
interrogatories and Rule 31 depositions.' Second, the time for
service of cross questions is extended from ten to thirty days, for
redirect questions from five to ten days, and for recross questions
from three to ten days.22 For cause shown, the court may enlarge
or shorten the time periods. 3 A third minor change is that the
notice of deposition upon written questions may designate the
witness by general description, class, or group if his name is not
known.24 This provision was adopted from similar Rule 30 provisions governing notice of oral depositions. 5
The fourth and fifth changes in Rule 31 are somewhat more
significant. Rule 31 has adopted the Rule 30 provision relating to
the deposition of a corporation or other organization." The deposition upon written questions may designate the organization itself as a deponent, thereby imposing a duty upon the organization
to designate an officer, agent, or other person to respond on its
behalf." Fifth, the new Rule 31 eliminates the limitations on
19. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 26.01, 278 Minn. at app. 32 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P. 31.01
(1977).
20. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 31, 278 Minn. at app. 41-42 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P. 31
(1977).
21. MINN. R. Civ. P. 31.01, Advisory Comm. Note-1975.
22. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 31.01, 278 Minn. at app. 41-42 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P.
31.01 (1977).
23. MINN R. Civ. P. 31.01 (1977). A major disadvantage of the time schedule is that all
questioning is usually complete before any answers are received. This disadvantage has
been circumvented to some extent by court orders delaying the time for serving cross
questions. See, e.g., Spotts v. O'Neil, 30 F. Supp. 669, 669-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). See also
Baron v. Leo Feist, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (order allowing recross after filing
of answers to direct questions). In addition, the courts have not ruled against the practice
of giving the deponent advance copies of the questions. See Hamdi & Ibrahim Mango Co.
v. Fire Assoc., 20 F.R.D. 181, 182-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
At least one federal court has held that the direct or redirect questions can be oral rather
than written. See Winograd Bros. v. Chase Bank, 31 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). But
cf. United States v. National City Bank, 1 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (questions for crossexamination must be written).
24. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 31.01, 278 Minn. at app. 41-42 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P.
31.01 (1977).
25. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.02 (1977).
26. See notes 223-27 infra and accompanying text.
27. This requirement and the similar requirement in Rule 30.02(6) were added to eliminate the previous difficulties in determining whether an employee or agent of the corpora-
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timing of depositions which were imposed under old Rule 26.8
Under old Rule 26, all depositions, whether oral or written, required leave of court if taken within twenty days after the commencement of the action. 9 Rule 31 now merely provides that
depositions upon written questions may be taken "after commencement of the action." 3 Thus, unlike oral depositions, a
deposition upon written questions may be taken at any time after
service of the summons."
C.

Rule 32: Use of Depositions in Court Proceedings

Rule 32 makes only minor clarifying changes in the former rule
which prescribes the conditions under which oral or written depositions may be used at trial or upon the hearing of a motion or
an interlocutory proceeding. Most of the old rule was retained.2
One change, however, is a new provision allowing adverse use
of the deposition of a person designated by a corporation or other
organization to testify on its behalf at the taking of the deposition.3 This addition accomodates the new procedure for designattion was a "managing agent" who may be deposed. MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.02(6)., Advisory
Comm. Note-1975. Under the old rule, oftentimes many officers had to be deposed
because each would deny knowledge of the information. See Kroll & Maciszewski, PreTrial Discovery: Change in the Federal Rules, 7 HAWAII B.J. 48, 52 (1970), reprinted in
W. TREADWELL, NEW FEDERAL CIVIL DISCOVERY RULES SOURCEBOOK 205, 209 (1972).
28. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 26.01, 278 Minn. at app. 32 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P. 31
(1977).
29. See Dist. Ct. R. 26.01, 278 Minn. at app. 32 (1968). The reason for granting this
tactical advantage to the defendant was to prevent the plaintiff from proceeding with a
deposition or other discovery before the defendant had the opportunity to obtain counsel.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a), Notes of Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment, reprinted in 28
U.S.C.A. 243 (West 1972).
30. MINN. R. Civ. P. 31.01 (1977).
31. Compare MINN. R. Civ. P. 31.01 (1977) with id. 30.01. The difference exists because
Rule 31 written questions are submitted to the opposing counsel who then submits cross
questions. This procedure minimizes the element of surprise which might be present in
Rule 30 oral questioning.
32. MINN. R. Civ. P. 32.01(1) (1977) retains the provisions for using a deposition to
impeach a deponent who is a witness at trial, although the limitation to "material matters
only," under Dist. Ct. R. 26.04, 278 Minn. at app. 33 (1968), was eliminated. In addition,
Rule 32.01(2) still permits an adverse party to use, for any purpose, the deposition of
another party or of a person who at the time of taking the deposition was a representative
of a corporate party. Furthermore, no change was made in Rule 32.01(3) which provides
that a witness' deposition may be used for any purpose when the witness is unavailable
to testify at trial or in the event of exceptional circumstances. Finally, no substantial
change was made in the Rule 32.03 provision that a party makes a deponent his own
witness when he introduces the deposition into evidence, unless it is offered for impeachment, or as the deposition of an adverse party or his representative.
33. See MINN. R. CIrv. P. 32.01(2) (1977).
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ing a person to answer a deposition on behalf of a corporation or

organization .31
New Rule 32 also changes the former rule which provided that
a party introducing only a portion of a deposition into evidence
may be required by an adverse party to introduce additional parts
"relevant" to the portion introduced. 5 The rule now provides that
the adverse party may compel the introduction of additional
parts which "in fairness" ought to be considered with the portion
introduced. 3 The provision that any party may introduce any
37
other portion of the deposition is retained.
Only minor change was made in the rule governing objections
to the admissibility of depositions.3 8 Unless waived, 39 objections
at trial to the admissibility of the deposition may be made upon
the same grounds as if the deposition witness were present at the
trial and testifying to the matters contained in his deposition.
This eliminates any hearsay objection based on the deponent's
absence from court. 0 The only change in waiver of objections is
reflected in the time period within which objections to the form
of written questions may be made. 4' Objections can now be made
34. See notes 223-27 infra and accompanying text.
35. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 26.04(4), 278 Minn. at app. 34 (1968) with MINN. R. CIv. P.
32.01(4) (1977).
36. See MINN. R. Crv. P. 32.01(4) (1977). The rule provides that additional parts may
be compelled by an adverse party when the partial deposition is offered "in evidence."
This suggests that the provision does not apply if the deposition is offered for purposes of
impeachment only.
37. Id.
38. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 26.05, 278 Minn. at app. 34 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P. 32.02
(1977).
39. The following objections are waived if not made at the taking of the deposition: (1)
objections relating to the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony or the competency of a witness, provided the grounds for the objection might have been removed had
it been made at that time; (2) objections relating to errors and irregularities in the manner
of taking the oral examination, in the form of the questions or answers, in the conduct of
the parties, or any other errors that would have been removed had timely objection been
made; and (3) objections relating to the form of written questions unless made within the
time allowed for serving the succeeding cross or other questions and within five days from
the service of the last questions permitted by the rules. MINN. R. Civ. P. 32.04(3) (1977).
40. Under Dist. Ct. R. 26.04, 278 Minn. at app. 33-34 (1968), a deposition could be used
at trial only so far as it fell "under the rules of evidence." Because the former rule did
not express the qualification that the deponent need not be at trial, possible hearsay
objections under the rules of evidence could have been fatal to the introduction of a
deposition. See generally 2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 641-657 (Wright ed. 1961). The new rule eliminates this hearsay objection by requiring
the evidentiary determination to be made "as though the witness were then present and
testifying." MINN. R. Civ. P. 32.01 (1977).
41. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 32.03, 278 Minn. at app. 43 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P. 32.04
(1977).
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within five days from the service of the last questions permitted
by the rules, rather than three days.2
D.

Rule 33: Interrogatoriesto Parties

Rule 33, governing the procedure for written interrogatories to
a party,"' makes substantial changes in old Rule 33.44 The first
change relates to the timing of the questions, answers, and objections to interrogatories. A second change relates to additional
requirements and prerogatives in the interrogatory answer. A
third change relates to the scope of the interrogatory.
Unlike old Rule 33, which required leave of court to serve the
interrogatory by plaintiff within ten days after commencement of
the action,45 new Rule 33 allows the plaintiff as well as any other
party to serve interrogatories on any party with or at any time
after service of process without leave of court."6 Rule 33 also extends the time for service of written answers or objections. 47 The
old rule required service of answers and objections within fifteen
days after the service of the interrogatory, unless the court enlarged or shortened the time. 8 The new rule allows thirty days
from service of interrogatories, except defendants are allowed
42. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 32.03(2), 278 Minn. at app. 43 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P.
32.04(3)(c) (1977).
43. For a discussion of the advisability of altering Rule 33 to permit service of interrogatories on nonparty witnesses, see Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. Rv.
940, 1020-22 (1961).
44. The primary purpose of the changes is to reduce the need for intervention of the
court. See MINN. R. Civ. P., Advisory Comm. Note-1975, Introduction. This purpose is
furthered by the amendments which reduce court intervention with regard to interrrogatories because interrogatories traditionally cause a greater percentage of objections and
motions than any other discovery device.
45. Dist. Ct. R. 33(1), 278 Minn. at app. 44 (1968).
46. MINN. R. Civ. P. 33.01(1) (1977). Because the time for response to the interrogatory
has been lengthened, see notes 47-50 infra and accompanying text, requiring leave of court
is no longer necessary to assure that defendant has adequate time to obtain counsel. See
MINN. R. Civ. P. 33.01(1), Advisory Comm. Note-1975.
47. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 33(2), 278 Minn. at app. 44 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P.
33.01(2) (1977).
48. See Dist. Ct. R. 33(2), 278 Minn. at app. 44 (1968). These former time limitations
were so short that they tended to encourage objections and court motions. In addition, if
the party failed to object within the 15-day period he risked a waiver of his objections.
See, e.g., United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, 66 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Ill. 1975) (failure to
object in time is a waiver of all objections, including privilege); Cleminshaw v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 21 F.R.D. 300 (D. Del. 1957). In practice, parties seldom sought the permitted extension of time, but instead simply objected because Rule 33 imposes no sanction
for unjustified objections.
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forty-five days from service of process.49 The new rule retains the
provision that the court may enlarge or shorten the time.50
Interrogatory answers are now subject to additional requirements and prerogatives. Rule 33 continues the requirement that
answers shall be signed under oath.' It adds, however, a provision
requiring that each interrogatory52 be restated in the answer to
that interrogatory. 3 The purpose of this additional requirement
is to facilitate more convenient use of the interrogatories at trials
and hearings by eliminating the necessity of referring back to the
questions.5 4 Rule 33 also adds a provision which allows a party to
answer an interrogatory by merely indicating from which of his
business records the answer may be obtained. 5 Several conditions
must be satisfied before this method of answering is allowed.
First, and most obvious, the answer must be ascertainable from
the business records of the party upon whom the interrogatory is
served. Second, the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer
must be substantially the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party served. Finally, the party serving the
interrogatory must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
examine and make copies of the pertinent business records. 56
The third aspect of Rule 33 which was changed is the scope of
the interrogatory. The scope of discovery for written interrogato49. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 33.01(2) (1977).
50. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 33(2), 278 Minn. at app. 44 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P.
33.01(2) (1977).
51. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 33(4), 278 Minn. at app. 44 (1968) with MINN. R. CIrv. P.
33.01(4) (1977).
52. Interrogatories are limited to 50 per party, with each subdivision of separate questions counted as one interrogatory. MINN. R. Civ. P. 33.01(1) (1977).
53. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 33(4), 278 Minn. at app. 44 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P.
33.01(4) (1977). The federal rules have not added this requirement. See FED. R. Civ. P.
33 (1977).
54. MINN. R. Civ. P. 33.01, Advisory Comm. Note-1975.
55. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 33, 278 Minn. at app. 44-45 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P. 33.03
(1977). The purpose of the new rule is to relieve the burden and expense of answering an

interrogatory dealing with business records. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2178 (1970). This amendment should prove to be useful in
antitrust, products liability, and other complex cases involving voluminous papers and
documents.
56. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 33.03 (1977). A responding party cannot merely indicate a mass
of records into which research can be made. That type of answer could invoke a challenge
by motion under Rule 37.01 to compel an answer. The respondent should concretely
indicate the documents from which the information can be obtained, rather than just
indicating a collection of documents. See In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 53 F.R.D.
87, 90 (D. Conn. 1971).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol3/iss1/2

8

19771

Danforth: The 1975 Amendments
to the RULES
Minnesota Rules of Discovery
DISCOVERY

ries is governed generally by Rule 26, 51 which also has a specific
provision for the use of interrogatories to ascertain the names of
expert trial witnesses" along with the substance of their expected
testimony and the basis for their opinions. New Rule 33 enlarges
the scope of discovery to include inquiry as to opinions, conclusions, and contentions upon mixed questions of law and fact.5
This serves to narrow the issues, although answers to interrogatories generally do not limit proof at trial"° except in exceptional
circumstances when a party has relied on the answers to his prejudice."' The court may permit a delay in answering interrogatories concerning opinions or contentions pending further discovery
or pretrial conference. 2
E.

Rule 34: Production of Documents and Things and Entry
upon Land for Inspection and Other Purposes

Rule 34 provides for the production of documents and tangible
things and the entry upon land for the purposes of discovery. It
is available only against a party. 3 By the express terms of Rule
57. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02 (1977).
58. See id. 26.02(4).
59. Id. 33.02. Federal law prior to the 1970 federal amendments contains a longstanding dispute as to the discoverability of opinions and contentions of a party. For a
summary of the conflicting authorities, see 4A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 33.17 (2d ed.
1975) and 2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 768 (Wright
ed. 1961).
It is now permissible within the amended rule to ask questions calling for an opposing
party's specific position relating to the facts of the claim, even if the facts themselves are
already known to the questioning party. See, e.g., United States v. Beatrice Foods Co.,
52 F.R.D. 14, 19-20 (D. Minn. 1971). Even under the new rule, however, interrogatories
may not include questions extending to issues of "pure law" unrelated to the facts of the
particular case. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 61 F.R.D. 411
(W.D. Pa. 1973) (dictum) (discovery of an opinion based on hypothetical facts is improper); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 59 F.R.D. 500 (N.D. IIl. 1973)
(dictum).
60. See, e.g., Pressley v. Boehlke, 33 F.R.D. 316, 317 (W.D.N.C. 1963); McElroy v.
United Air Lines, 21 F.R.D. 100, 102 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
61. See, e.g., Zielinski v. Philadelphia Piers, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 408, 413-14 (E.D. Pa.
1956).
62. MINN. R. Civ. P. 33.02 (1977). This authorization to delay an answer is allowed
because of the likelihood that questions of mixed law and fact will cause disputes which
are better resolved after other discovery is completed or in the presence of a judge. This
procedure is analogous to the provisions of Rule 26.02(4) which relate to experts expected
to testify at trial. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 33.02, Advisory Comm. Note-1975.
63. MINN. R. Civ. P. 34.01 (1977). Rule 45.04(1), however, permits the serving of a
subpoena duces tecum on a nonparty to produce materials at a deposition. See Continental Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 382 (N.D. Il. 1970). In addition, a party may
obtain the production of documents and things from a nonparty by an independent suit
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34, it applies only to those documents, tangible things, and land
which are within the provisions of Rule 26 limiting the scope of
discovery. 4 Thus, for example, production of documents or tangible things containing work product is not contemplated by Rule
34 .5 Two aspects of Rule 34 have been changed by the 1975
amendments-scope and procedure.
The scope of Rule 34 has been changed in two ways. First, the
description of the documents that may be obtained from a party
for inspection and copying has been extended to include data
compilations from which the responding party may be required
to provide usable information by means of his detection devices.66
For example, he may be required to supply a printout of computer
data. 7 The second change provides that tangible things and land
may now be tested and sampled as well as inspected or copied.68
New Rule 34 also introduces substantial procedural changes
intended to facilitate the informal production of materials without court intervention. 9 Discovery is initiated by a request instead of a motion to produce supported by a showing of good
cause." Leave of court is not required to initiate Rule 34 procein equity.

64.

MINN.

MINN.

R. Civ. P. 34.03 (1977).

R. Civ. P. 34.01 (1977); see, e.g., Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. Goldman,

Sachs & Co., 58 F.R.D. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (documents must be relevant within the
meaning of Rule 26); Tinder v. McGowan, 15 FED. RULES SEar. 2D 1608 (W.D. Pa. 1970)
(same).
65. MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(3) (1977); see notes 125-67 infra and accompanying text.
66. MINN. R. Civ. P. 34.01 (1977). Although this will put a burden on the responding
party, the court may protect against undue burden or expense by restricting discovery or
requiring reimbursement of expenses. Id. 26.03. Rule 26.03 also enables the court to protect the responding party's need for preservation and confidentiality of the records produced.
67. See Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 220 (W.D. Va. 1972).
68. MINN. R. Civ. P. 34.01 (1977). Even prior to the 1975 amendment, the word
"inspection" probably had a broader meaning than just the right to "look;" it included
the right to sample and test. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corp., 297 F.2d 49, 57
(9th Cir. 1961). It seems clear that a party is free to perform the tests in the manner he
decides is best. See Sperberg v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 61 F.R.D. 80, 83 (N.D. Ohio
1973).
69. MINN. R. Civ. P. 34, Advisory Comm. Note-1975; see Abel Inv. Co. v. United
States, 53 F.R.D. 485, 487 (D. Neb. 1971).
70. MINN. R. Civ. P. 34.02 (1977). Before the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, definitions of "good cause" varied from "relevancy," Houdry Process
Corp. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 24 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), to "not available from
another source," Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 985 (1964). It is clear that "relevancy" has now replaced the "good cause"
requirement. See White v. Jaegerman, 51 F.R.D. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); note 64 supra and
accompanying text. This has little impact on Minnesota law, however, because even under
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dures,7 although court intervention might be required to satisfy
Rule 26 and Rule 35 provisions limiting the discovery of trial
preparation materials and expert witnesses.72
New provisions set forth the degree of specificity required in
requests and responses. The request must set forth the item to be
inspected with reasonable particularity.13 Responses must state
with respect to each item or category whether the party will object to or permit inspection. Reasons for any objections must also
be stated.74
Finally, new provisions similar to those in new Rule 3375 set
forth limitations on the timing of requests and responses. The
plaintiff may serve the request with or after service of process. 8
Any other party may serve the request after commencement of
the action.77 Unless a protective order is obtained, 8 a written
response permitting discovery or containing objections to the request must be served within thirty days after service of the request except that a defendant may have forty-five days from
service of process." Failure to respond may lead to Rule 37 sanctions.80
F.

Rule 36: Requests for Admission

Rule 36 provides that a party may request from any other party
the admission of certain matters for the purposes of the pending
action only."' The 1975 amendments affected Rule 36 by changing
old Rule 34 the Minnesota court viewed "good cause" as requiring relevancy. See In re
Estate of Sandstrom, 252 Minn. 46, 61-62, 89 N.W.2d 19, 28-29 (1958); Webster v.
Schwartz, 249 Minn. 224, 227-28 & n.1, 81 N.W.2d 867, 870-71 & n.1 (1957).
71. MINN. R. Civ. P. 34.02 (1977). This change conforms the rule to the existing practice.
Thus, although the change will not much affect the present practice, it will save court
time.
72. See id. 26.02(3), 35.02, 35.04; notes 125-67 infra and accompanying text.
73. MINN. R. Crv. P. 34.02 (1977). The request is sufficiently specific if a reasonable
person would know what documents or things were called for. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt
Chem. Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 58 F.R.D. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
74. MINN. R. Civ. P. 34.02 (1977).
75. See notes 45-50 supra and accompanying text.
76. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 34.02 (1977).
77. Id.
78. See id. 26.03.
79. Id. 34.02.
80. See id. 37.01(2), .02(2).
81. The purpose of the amended rule is to eliminate as many of the issues as possible
and to facilitate proof of the remaining issues. FED. R. Civ. P. 36, Notes of Advisory
Comm.-1970 Amendment, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 49-51 (West Supp. 1977). See
generally Finman, The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Procedure, 71 YALE L.J.
371 (1962).
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the provisions concerning the timing of requests and responses,
the scope of the request, the ability to use lack of information or
knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny, the objections
to the request, and the binding effect of admissions.
The timing limitations on requests and responses are identical
to new Rule 33 provisions for interrogatories."s Requests may be
served without leave of court on the defendant with or after service of process and on the plaintiff after commencement of the
action.83 This changes the old rule which required leave of court
if the plaintiff sought to serve the request within ten days after
commencement of the action.8 4 Within thirty days from service of
the request, a party must respond to each request by objecting
with reasons, 85 by answering with an admission or denial of the
subject matter of the request, or by stating reasons why it cannot
be denied or admitted." However, the defendant usually does not
have to respond before the expiration of forty-five days after serv87
ice of process.
Rule 36 continues the provision that the truth of each matter
not so answered by denial or not objected to is admitted8 except
when the answering party gives reasons in detail why he cannot
truthfully admit or deny the subject matter of a particular re82. See notes 45-50 supra and accompanying text.
83. MINN. R. Civ. P. 36.01 (1977).
84. Dist. Ct. R. 36.01, 278 Minn. at app. 47-48 (1968).
85. Courts were divided in the past as to whether parties may object to requests for
admission on the grounds that it is a matter in dispute. See FED. R. CIV. P. 36, Notes of
Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 49 (West Supp. 1977). The
notes of the Federal Advisory Committee indicate that the proper response in such a case
is an answer. Id. See also Ranger Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 49 F.R.D. 181 (N.D. Ga. 1969)
(defendant must answer request for admission on a controverted fact even if it is crucial
to liability); Khalili v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 22 (D. Alas. 1969) (disputed
fact is a proper subject of a request for admission).
86. MINN. R. Civ. P. 36.01 (1977).
87. Id. The rule also provides, however, that the court may shorten the time and require
the defendant to respond within the 45-day period.
88. See, e.g., Duncan v. Lord, 409 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Jackson v. Riley Stoker
Corp., 57 F.R.D. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Heichman, 45 F.R.D. 122 (N.D.
Ill. 1968). See also Pickens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 413 F.2d 1390 (5th Cir. 1969)
(issue deemed admitted still submitted to jury; directed verdict not required).
If the issues admitted are facts dispositive of the case, admission may form the basis
for summary judgment, Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 388 F. Supp. 1070 (D.N.J.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 534 F.2d 566 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3463
(U.S. Jan. 11, 1977) (No. 76-174), even where the admission was due to a failure to respond
or object. See, e.g., Freed v. Plastic Packaging Materials, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 550 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Williams v. Krieger, 61 F.R.D. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (dictum); Jackson v. Riley
Stoker Corp., 57 F.R.D. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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quest.8 9 An additional requirement is imposed, however, if lack of
information or knowledge is given as a reason for failure to admit
or deny. In that instance, Rule 36 now requires that the responding party must have used efforts to get readily available knowledge and information and that his answer so state."
Rule 36 enlarges the scope of requests for admission. Under the
old rule, a party could only request the admission of a factual
matter.9' New Rule 36 now allows a party to request the admission of "opinions of fact" and "the application of law to fact,"
thus encompassing opinions and conclusions on matters involving
92
law and fact.
mixed
Rule 36 also provides that the requesting and not
the answering
party shall move for a hearing on objections to requests or on the
sufficiency of answers. 3 The court may award expenses in accordance with the provisions of Rule 37.94 The failure to answer a
request when ordered by the court does not automatically result
in an admission. It does, however, allow the court to deem the
matter admitted," and the requesting party may also recover the
costs and attorney's fees incurred in proving matters not admitted.96
Finally, Rule 36 now makes it clear that an admission is conclu89. MINN. R. Civ. P. 36.01 (1977).
90. Id. This amendment adopts the majority view that a responding party must make
an effort to inform himself rather than simply answer on the basis of his present knowledge. See, e.g., Hise v. Lockwood Grader Corp., 153 F. Supp. 276 (D. Neb. 1957); E.H.
Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enterprises, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 571, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1954). See also Finman,
supra note 81, at 404-09. The cases decided since the amendment of the federal rules have
assumed a requirement of good faith efforts. See, e.g., Havenfield Corp. v. H. & R. Block,
Inc., 67 F.R.D. 93 (W.D. Mo. 1973). The change is consistent with the general principle
of the discovery rules that a reasonable burden may be imposed if it will facilitate trial
and its preparation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 36, Notes of Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment,
reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 49 (West Supp. 1977).
Of course there also remains the duty to supplement answers and admissions with
subsequently acquired information. See Criterion Music Corp. v. Tucker, 45 F.R.D. 534
(S.D. Ga. 1968); notes 181-96 infra and accompanying text.
91. Dist. Ct. R. 36.01, 278 Minn. at app. 47-48 (1968).
92. MINN. R. Civ. P. 36.01 (1977).
93. Id. 36.01. The prior rule placed the burden on the answering party by requiring a
notice of hearing on the objections to be made. Dist. Ct. R. 36.01, 278 Minn. at app. 4748 (1968). The change in the burden of moving the court should not, however, shift the
burden of persuasion. FED. R. Civ. P. 36, Notes of Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment,
reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 49-50 (West Supp. 1977).
94. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 37.03 (1977).
95. Id. 36.01.
96. Id. 37.03.
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sively binding for the purposes of the pending action,97 unless the
court permits it to be amended or withdrawn."
G.

Rule 37: Failure to Make Discovery; Sanctions

Rule 37 prescribes the sanctions that may be imposed for failure to make discovery and the procedures required for their imposition. Most of the rule is applicable to all forms of discovery, but
parts of it are applicable only to specific discovery devices. The
portions of the rule applicable only to specific discovery devices
have undergone minor change, and will not be discussed at length
here.
A major substantive change in Rule 37 is that sanctions are now
imposed for "failure" instead of "refusal" to make discovery.
Thus, any requirement of willfulness is removed. 9 The element
of willfulness is relevant only to the issue of what particular sanctions, if any, should be imposed for the failure to make discov97. Under the amended rule, an admission is comparable to a stipulation made at trial.
The admitting party should not be allowed to contradict or change any admitted facts.
See, e.g., Kuenne v. Loffler, 266 Md. 468, 295 A.2d 219 (1972). In contrast to an admission,
the answer to an interrogatory is mere evidence which must be weighed and analyzed by
the factfinder. See, e.g., Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Stockton Stevedoring Co., 388 F.2d 955,
959 (9th Cir. 1968). See also Freed v. Erie Lackawanna Ry., 445 F.2d 619, 621 (6th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017 (1972) (evidence which conflicts with interrogatory
answer may be received). This amendment to the rule will go far towards increasing the
use of requests for admissions because the party can now depend on their binding effect.
See generally Finman, supra note 81, at 418-26; Comment, The Dilemma of FederalRule
36, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 679, 682-83 (1961).
98. MINN. R. Civ. P. 36.02 (1977). Although it is important that the admissions be given
binding effect, the provision for withdrawal or amendment is a safeguard against undue
prejudice to a party or interference with trial on the merits. See Moosman v. Joseph P.
Blitz, Inc., 358 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1966) (effect of admission may be avoided by an
untimely answer under "compelling circumstances").
99. This change was made to eliminate the confusion that existed formerly because the
old rule used the terms "failure" and "refusal," both of which implied a requirement of
willfulness in the responding party's noncompliance. See, e.g., Campbell v. Johnson, 101
F. Supp. 705, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Roth v. Paramount Pictures Distrib. Corp., 8 F.R.D.
31 (W.D. Pa. 1948). See generally Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate PretrialDiscovery,
58 COLUM. L. REV. 480 (1958). In 1958, the United States Supreme Court held that a simple
failure to comply with the request for discovery was to be construed as a "refusal" within
the meaning of the rule. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). The
rule in Rogers was not immediately accepted by the lower courts, however. See Hinson v.
Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 275 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1960). The federal rules were amended
in 1970 to correspond with the interpretation set forth in Rogers, and the federal courts
have now complied with this interpretation. See, e.g., Roberson v. Christoferson, 65
F.R.D. 615 (D.N.D. 1975); Bollard v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 569 (W.D.
Mo. 1971).
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ery."'0 Furthermore, evasive or incomplete answers constitute a
failure to answer. 0'
A motion for an order compelling discovery and a failure to
obey that order are conditions precedent to the imposition of
sanctions under Rule 37.1°2 A court order may already be required
or available under the rule dealing with the particular discovery
device, and therefore a further court order under Rule 37 is redundant and unnecessary for imposition of sanctions. 0 3 When a court
order is not obtained or required under the rule governing the
particular discovery device, a Rule 37 motion must be made to
obtain a court order compelling discovery of the desired matters. 104 Rule 37 motions encompass the situations where a party
or other witness fails to answer a question at the taking of his
deposition, a corporate party fails to designate a witness or to
testify for the corporation or other organization at a deposition,
a party fails to answer a written interrogatory, and a party in
100. MINN. R. Civ. P. 37.02, Advisory Comm. Note-1975. Drastic sanctions such as
dismissal or default will usually not be imposed without the element of willfulness being
evident in the answering party's failure to respond. See, e.g., Fox v. StudebakerWorthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1975); General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co.,
481 F.2d 1204, 1210-15 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1973).
In Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1975), the court held
that discovery sanctions are within the sound discretion of the trial court and the imposition of sanctions will not be reversed without a showing of abuse of that discretion. The
court found, however, that because the sanction of dismissal is so drastic, the trial court's
discretion is accordingly very narrow. Thus willfulness, fault, or bad faith are factors that
must be present in the responding party's noncompliance. 516 F.2d at 993 (citing Societe
Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958)).
101. MINN. R. Civ. P. 37.01(3) (1977). The courts appear to agree that they may remedy
incomplete and inadequate answers by an order compelling an answer, but not by sanctions. Sanctions for failure to answer are improper for anything other than a total failure
to answer. A motion to compel is the proper remedy for a failure to answer adequately.
See, e.g., Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989, 995 (8th Cir. 1975); Flaks
v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1974); Anderson v, Home Style Stores, Inc., 58 F.R.D.
125, 129-30 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
102. MINN. R. Civ. P. 37.01(4) (1977); cf. GFI Computer Indus., Inc. v. Fry, 476 F.2d 1
(5th Cir. 1973) (default judgment reversed because of failure to move for an order to
compel); Vac-Air, Inc. v. John Mohr & Sons, 471 F.2d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1973) (same).
103. MINN. R. Civ. P. 37.01(4) (1977). The rules are not clear, however, on whether a
party who obtains an order compelling discovery must come into court a second time to
move for imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with the initial order. Although not
specifically authorized by the rules, many trial judges specify in the order compelling
discovery just what sanctions will be imposed for failure to comply with the order. This
allows the court to impose sanctions without another formal hearing. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has affirmed the use of an order which alternatively imposed sanctions
for failure to comply with its terms. See O'Neil v. Corrick, - Minn. __,
239 N.W.2d
230 (1976).
104. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 37.01(2) (1977).
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response to a request for production of materials for inspection
fails to state that inspection will be permitted or fails to permit
inspection.' 5
The motion for an order compelling discovery, when required,
must be brought in the appropriate court. The old rules allowed
the motion to be made in the court where the action was pending."'° This remains unchanged by new Rule 37 except for failure
to answer questions at a deposition. If the deponent is a party,
the motion to compel an answer to a deposition may be made
either to the court in which the action is pending or to the court
in the county where the deposition is being taken. 0 7 If the deponent is not a party, the motion to compel answers to a deposition
must be made to the court in the county where the deposition is
being taken.',
Upon granting or denying a motion to compel discovery the
court may award expenses and fees to the prevailing party unless
the court finds the conduct of the losing party or person supporting or opposing the motion was "substantially justified."'0 9 Expenses may be apportioned when the motion is granted in part
0 The rule
and denied in part."1
makes the award of expenses presumptively appropriate, changing the language of the old rule
which made the award presumptively inappropriate."' This
change was made to encourage the award of expenses and fees."'
If a motion to compel discovery is denied in whole or in part,
the court may enter a protective order against the moving
105. Id. The duty to answer includes an obligation to afford sufficient consultation as
to the meaning of the documents, see King v. Georgia Power Co., 50 F.R.D. 134 (N.D.
Ga. 1970) (explanation of employment test scores in job discrimination action), or to make
appropriate computations, see Hunter v. International Systems & Controls Corp., 51
F.R.D. 251, 256-57 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (discovery ordered), supplemented, 56 F.R.D. 617
(W.D. Mo. 1972) (sanctions imposed).
106. Dist. Ct. R. 37.01, 278 Minn. at app. 48 (1968).
107. MINN. R. Civ. P. 37.01(1) (1977). Although the party seeking discovery may choose
which court to use, the court has the power to override his choice and remit the motion
to the other forum if it is more appropriate. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37, Notes of Advisory
Comm.-1970 Amendment, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 58 (West Supp. 1977).
In the past, courts resorted to a theory that the court where the action was pending had
"inherent power" to compel the answer of a party deponent. See, e.g., Lincoln Labs., Inc.
v. Savage Labs., Inc., 27 F.R.D. 476 (D. Del. 1961). The new rule provides the authority
necessary to compel an answer and clarifies the respective roles of the courts involved.
108. MINN. R. Civ. P. 37.01(1) (1977).
109. Id. 37.01(4).
110. Id.
111. Dist. Ct. R. 37.03, 278 Minn. at app. 50 (1968).
112. MINN. R. Civ. P. 37.01(4), Advisory Comm. Note-1975.
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party." 3 If the motion is granted, various sanctions may be imposed for failure to comply with the resulting court order."' The
sanctions which may be imposed for failure to obey a court order
differ depending upon which court made the order. Contempt is
the only sanction that may be imposed by the court in the district
where a deposition is taken for failure to be sworn or to obey an
order compelling an answer."' Because the old rules did not contemplate sanctions by courts other than the one in which the
action was pending, this provision is new. The sanctions that may
be imposed by the court in which the action is pending remain
essentially unchanged."" A provision is added, however, whereby
the expenses and fees caused by a party's failure to obey an order
for discovery "shall" be awarded against that party or the attorney advising him unless the disobedience was substantially justified or other circumstances make the award unjust."7

III.

RULE

26:

GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCOVERY

Rule 26 is a rule of general applicability to all the discovery
devices. These devices are Rule 30 depositions on oral examination, Rule 31 depositions on written questions, Rule 33 written
interrogatories, Rule 34 production of documents or things, Rule
35 physical and mental examinations, and Rule 36 requests for
admission. Rule 26 prescribes generally"' and specifically"' what
is discoverable under the various discovery devices.
Generally, relevant nonprivileged matter is discoverable,1 0
subject, however, to Rule 35 restrictions on discovery of physical
and mental examinations, Rule 26 restrictions on discovery of
113. MINN. R. Civ. P. 37.01(4) (1977); see id. 26.03.
114. Id. 37.02.
115. Id. 37.02(1).
116. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 37.02, 278 Minn. at app. 49 (1968) with MINN. R. Crv. P.
37.02(2) (1977). The sanctions which may be imposed include an order establishing designated facts for the purpose of the action, prohibiting certain defenses, striking pleadings,
staying proceedings, dismissing the action in whole or in part, rendering a default judgment, or citing the party with contempt of court. The contempt citation is a remedial
rather than punitive measure, however, and the party might be allowed to rid himself of
the sanction by complying with the order. See United States v. International Business
Mach. Corp., 60 F.R.D. 658, 667 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 493 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 976 (1974).
117. MINN. R. Civ. P. 37.01(4) (1977).
118. Id. 26.02(1).
119. Id. 26.02(2)-(4).
120. See id. 26.02(1).
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trial preparation materials 2 ' and facts and opinions known by
experts,'2 2 and Rule 26 protective orders.2 3 Only the Rule 26 limitations have been changed by the 1975 amendments. 4 In addition, new provisions have been added to Rule 26 relating to the
sequence, timing, and frequency of discovery devices and to the
continuing duty to supplement discovery responses. These
changes and additions are discussed below.
A.

Restrictions on the Discovery of Trial PreparationMaterials

The most significant change in the limitations on discovery are
found in the new work product rules. The first change concerns
the necessity of showing need as a condition to the discovery of
trial preparation materials. Statements of witnesses prepared by
or for a party or his representative in anticipation of trial are
now discoverable without a showing of need. 25 The term "statement" is defined to include recorded oral statements or transcriptions thereof and written statements signed or adopted by
121. See id. 26.02(3).
122. See id. 26.02(4).
123. See id. 26.03.
124. The discoverability of liability insurance, however, is continued under the 1975
amendments. See id. 26.02(2).
125. MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(3). At least two reasons justify the change. First, the discoverability of a party's own statement reduces the threat that it will unknowingly be used
against him as an admission. See Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Hav. L. REv.
940, 1039 (1961). Second, it is arguable that a court would inevitably find a showing of
"substantial need" for the statement and inability to obtain the equivalent "without
undue hardship." The particular statement, if not remembered by the party making it,
usually cannot be obtained by means other than from the adverse party. Thus, courts
under the old rules often found "good cause." See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. Carr, 251
F.2d 433, 435 (4th Cir. 1957).
Even before the 1975 amendments to the Minnesota rules of discovery, a party had a
statutory right to obtain his own statement without a showing of good cause. MINN. STAT.
§ 602.01 (1976) states in part that "[n]o statement [from an injured person] can be used
as evidence in any court unless the party so obtaining the statement shall give to such
injured person a copy thereof within 30 days after the same was made." The effect of the
statute is limited. First, it does not create a right in the injured party to acquire his
statement, rather it creates an obligation on the other party to deliver the statement if it
is sought to be used as evidence. Second, it applies only to a person suing to recover for
his personal injuries. Hillesheim v. Stippel, 283 Minn. 59, 166 N.W.2d 325 (1969).
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the person making them. 2" This definition is adopted from the
Jencks Act.2 7 Since the provisions relate to discovery of documents and tangible things in preparation of trial, the rule makes
no provision for the discovery of unrecorded oral statements. This
could mean that unrecorded oral statements are not discoverable,
or it could mean that existing case law 2 " is continued, making
these statements discoverable only upon a showing of good cause.
Documents and tangible things, other than statements of witnesses or parties, prepared by or for a party or his representative2 9 in anticipation of trial 3 are discoverable only upon a special showing of substantial need for the materials in the preparation of the case and inability without undue hardship to obtain
their substantial equivalent by other means. 131 Mere relevancy is
not a sufficient showing. If a Rule 34 objection is made to the
production of such documents, the required showing must be
made upon motion to the court for an order compelling discovery. 32 Of course, no special showing is required for discovery of
materials not prepared in anticipation of litigation such as routine business records or reports which are otherwise discovera33
ble.
126. MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(3) (1977).
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1)-(3) (1970).
128. E.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Leininger v. Swadner, 279 Minn.
251, 156 N.W.2d 254 (1968).
129. Although the Minnesota Advisory Committee said that it eliminated the word
"consultant" from the language of the rule as a "representative" of a party, the text of
the rule continues to include the word in a parenthetical. Compare MINN. R. Civ. P.
26.02(3), Advisory Comm. Note-1975 with MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(3) (1977). The advisory
notes should be considered when interpreting the rule, therefore the word "consultant"
should be construed narrowly in light of the broad possible application of the word.
130. The rule requires that the tangible things be prepared in anticipation of litigation.
The test is not whether they were prepared after commencement of the lawsuit.
"Anticipation" has been construed as including the prospect or risk of litigation created
by assertion of adverse rights. See American Optical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D.
426, 430-31 (D. Mass. 1972); Stix Prod., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 47 F.R.D.
334, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). A remote possibility of litigation, however, is insufficient to
constitute "anticipation" of litigation. Garfinckle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688,
690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792,
795 (D. Del. 1954).
131. MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(2) (1977); see Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc.,
Minn. - ...
254 N.W.?d 672, 681-82 (1977). The new federal rules impose the
requirement of "substantial need . . . and [inability] without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the'materials by other means," FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3),
because it was felt that the federal courts were requiring more than mere relevancy when
discovery of trial preparation materials was sought. Id., Notes of Advisory Comm.-1970
Amendment, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 157-60 (West 1972).
132. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 37.01(4) (1977).
133. E.g., Galumbus v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 64 F.R.D. 468, 472 (N.D. Ind.
1974). See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL.PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024.
at 199 & n.25 (1970); id. at 43 & n.25 (Supp. 1976).
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Although those portions of trial preparation documents containing opinions and contentions of the attorney are still not discoverable,'34 disclosure of opinions, contentions and conclusions
of fact or of mixed law and fact may be required in response to
Rule 33 interrogatories and to Rule 36 requests for admission
regardless of whether the opinions and contentions sought are
contained in work product documents. Also, relevant facts known
to a party are discoverable by deposition, interrogatories, and
requests for admission even though the facts are contained in a
document which is not discoverable for failure to make the required showing of need.' 35
B.

Restrictions on the Discovery of Experts

A second change in the work product rule is a new provision
dealing specially with the discovery of facts known and opinions
held by experts acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation
or for trial."'3 Discovery of information which the expert acquired
in a manner other than in anticipation of litigation is not subject
to the limitations of the new rule.'37 Four types of experts emerge
134. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(3) (1977). The protection is not removed by waiver of
the attorney-client privilege because the work product privilege belongs to the attorney
whereas the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client. See Vilastor-Kent Theatre
Corp. v. Brandt, 19 F.R.D. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). However, the protection might be removed after litigation ceases. There are three views on the discoverability of work product
after termination of the litigation in which it was prepared. See generally Cooper, Work
Product of the Rulemakers, 53 MINN. L. REV. 1269 (1969); Note, Discovery of an Attorney's
Work Product in Subsequent Litigation, 1974 DUKE L.J. 799. One view is that the work
product prepared for one suit loses its protection in a subsequent suit. See Honeywell, Inc.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Gulf Constr. Co. v. St. Joe Paper
Co., 24 F.R.D. 411 (S.D. Tex. 1959). The second view is that the work product protection
extends to subsequent "closely related" cases. See Midland Inv. Co. v. Van Alystyne, Noel
& Co., 59 F.R.D. 134, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American
Brass Co., 275 F. Supp. 146, 148 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Insurance Co. of North America v. Union
Carbide Corp., 35 F.R.D. 520 (D. Colo. 1964). A third view is that the work product
protection extends to any subsequent litigation. See Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1973).
In any event, the court might distill the attorney's opinions and contentions from other
information in the document and allow discovery of the information, provided the requisite showing of "substantial need" and "undue hardship" is made. Xerox Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); cf. Snyker v. Snyker, 245
Minn. 405, 72 N.W.2d 357 (1955) (evidence in document within attorney-client privilege
is protected; evidence in same document outside attorney-client privilege is discoverable).
135. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), Notes of Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment, reprinted
in 28 U.S.C.A. 157-60 (West 1972).
136. MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(4) (1977).
137. For example, discovery of information possessed by an eyewitness expert would
proceed as though the expert were an ordinary witness. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), Notes
of Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 160-62 (West 1972);
MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(4), Advisory Comm. Note-1975.
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from the rules of discovery. Rule 26 distinguishes between experts
who are expected to be called as trial witnesses 38 and experts who
have been retained or specially employed in preparation for trial
but who are not expected to be trial witnesses. 3 ' The scope of
discovery is greater with respect to the former. 140 The remaining
two types of experts are those informally consulted and those not
consulted at all. Discovery of information which an informally
consulted expert acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation is not permitted.' Discovery of an expert not consulted at
all must proceed as if he were a nonexpert witness.' Under subdivision A of new Rule 26.02(4) the names of expert witnesses
expected to be called at trial' and the substance of their expected testimony may be discovered by Rule 33 interrogatories.',
Under old Rule 26, only an expert's non-written conclusions could
be discovered.'4 5 In addition, subdivision A provides that a show138. See MINN. R. CW. P. 26.02(4)(A) (1977).
139. See id. 26.02(4)(B).
140. This distinction is a result of balancing two competing interests. A party has an
interest in protecting the information which he has obtained in preparation of trial from
usurpation by his opponent. The opponent and the judicial system, on the other hand,
have an interest in disclosure of the rationale underlying the conclusions of an adversary's
expert to facilitate determination of the expert's credibility through better crossexamination. Since the latter interest applies only to experts who will be called as witnesses, a party should be afforded greater protection against discovery of information
possessed by his expert if the expert is not expected to be a witness. See MINN. R. Civ. P.
26.02(4), Advisory Comm. Note-1975.
141. MIN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(4) (1977) states that discovery of expert information "may
The provisions which follow relate to expert witnesses,
be obtained only as follows ....
experts retained or specially employed, and the payment of fees and expenses for either
type of expert. Since there is no provision for experts not retained or specially employed,
discovery against such experts may not be obtained. See Nemetz v. Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66
(W.D. Pa. 1974); In re Brown Co. Sec. Litigation, 54 F.R.D. 384, 385 (E.D. La. 1972).
142. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(4), Advisory Comm. Note-1975. The Federal Advisory
Committee, however, classifies as ordinary witnesses those experts not consulted in preparation for trial who were witnesses to the event that is the subject of the lawsuit. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B), Notes of Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment, reprinted in 28
U.S.C.A. 161 (West 1972). The Committee's use of the terms "witness to the event"
implies that such experts cannot be discovered unless they were eyewitnesses. It seems
clear, however, that such experts should be discoverable even though they are not eyewitnesses.
143. The amendment codified a rule which had been adopted previously by judicial
decision. See Sanchez v. Waldrup, 271 Minn. 419, 136 N.W.2d 61 (1965).
144. MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(4)(A)(i) (1977).
145. Dist. Ct. R. 26.02, 278 Minn. at app. 33 (1968) provided: "The production or
inspection of any writing . . . that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories, or, except as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert,
shall not be required." The provision was ambiguous because it was not clear whether
"writing" modified only the clause referring to the attorney's work product or whether it
also modified the clause referring to expert's conclusions. Leininger v. Swadner, 279 Minn.
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ing of need is no longer required.'" Further discovery by other
means may be obtained only by order of court with appropriate
provisions for payment of the expert's fees and reimbursement of
the party who intends to use the expert at trial for past expenses
incurred in consulting him.'47 The rule does not specify what
showing, if any, is required for additional discovery. The requirement for payment of the expert's fees is mandatory, but reimbursement of a party's expenses is discretionary with the court.'48
Under subdivision B of new Rule 26.02(4), discovery of facts'
or opinions by any method from experts retained or specially
employed in preparation for trial, but not expected to be trial
witnesses, is permitted only upon a showing of the impracticability of obtaining the information sought by other means.'50 If the
expert retained or specially employed is a medical expert, discovery is permitted only in accordance with Rule 35.15i Payment of
the expert's fees and reimbursement of the other party's expenses
251, 156 N.W.2d 254 (1968), resolved this ambiguity in favor of the latter construction.
Thus, Dist. Ct. R. 26.02 was construed as prohibiting the discovery of an expert's conclusions only if in a writing.
146. A showing of need was eliminated to ease the burden of discovering the expected
testimony of the expert witness and thereby facilitate better preparation for rebuttal and
cross-examination of the expert. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), Notes of Advisory
Comm.-1970 Amendment, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 161 (West 1972). Similarly, the
Minnesota Supreme Court had previouly indicated that the purposes of impeachment or
corroboration are factors which may justify discovery of an expert's conclusion. See Leininger v. Swadner, 279 Minn. 251, 258-59, 156 N.W.2d 254, 260 (1968) (quoting Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)). In light of the importance of expert testimony in many
trials, the elimination of a required showing of need increases the prospect that such
litigation will be decided on the basis of credible expert testimony.
147. See MINN. R. Ctv. P. 26.02(4)(A)(ii) (1977).
148. See id. 26.02(4)(C).
149. Previous Minnesota case law had stated that limitations on discovery from an
adversary's expert applied only to the expert's conclusions and not to the underlying facts
which formed the basis of the expert's conclusions. See LeMieux v. Bishop, 296 Minn. 372,
382, 209 N.W.2d 379, 385 (1973); Leininger v. Swadner, 279 Minn. 251, 259, 156 N.W.2d
254, 259 (1968). In those cases, however, the expert was called as a witness and therefore
the holdings are not contrary to the new rule which places limitations on the discovery of
facts, as well as conclusions, of an expert who is not expected to be called as a witness.
150. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(4)(B) (1977). It has been argued that the rule operates
inequitably because it allows a party to "purchase" an expert and suppress his unfavorable findings simply by declining to offer his testimony at trial. See Note, Civil Procedure-Discoveryof Expert Information, 47 N.C.L. REv. 401, 406 (1969). It is doubtful that
the rule would have such an effect. The unfavorable findings of the opponent's
"purchased" expert could not be suppressed because if the party seeking discovery cannot
obtain the information elsewhere and by other means, the party seeking discovery will be
able to make a showing of need and thereby be entitled to the information.
151. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 35.01 (1977).
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in consulting the expert is mandatory if discovery is ordered
under Rule 26.
Since subdivision A of new Rule 26.02(4) eliminates the required showing of need only as to substance of the expert witness's "expected" testimony, theories and opinions of an expert
witness which will not be the subject of his testimony are not
encompassed by subdivision A. 5 ' Arguably, however, such information should be discoverable upon a required showing of exceptional circumstances. This result might be reached by two routes.
First, the expert witness might be viewed as a nonwitness expert
under subdivision B as to facts and opinions which will not be the
subject of his testimony, based on an argument that the critical
distinction underlying subdivision A and subdivision B of Rule
26.02(4) is not the identity of the expert, but rather whether the
expert information is expected to be presented at trial. Under this
approach, subdivision A would govern if information is expected
to be presented at trial; and if it is not expected to be presented
at trial, subdivision B would govern, thereby making the information discoverable only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.
The first route probably stretches the language of the rule too
far. A second alternative is based upon subdivision A itself. Subdivision A allows "further" discovery of expert witnesses beyond
their expected testimony upon order of the court. Presumably
this includes discovery of expert facts and opinions which are not
expected testimony. The court order probably would require,
however, a showing of some justification for the further discovery,
undoubtedly similar to the showing of exceptional circumstances
required by subdivision B.
One issue raised by the new provisions relating to discovery
against a nonwitness expert is the construction which will be
given to the required showing of "impracticability of obtaining
the information by other means." It has been suggested that the
required showing may be difficult to establish because the party
seeking discovery does not even know the facts or opinions of the
adversary's expert and therefore cannot establish that they are
unavailable by other means.'53 Certainly the drafters of the rule
did not intend to impose an inherently contradictory requirement
152. See Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 60 F.R.D. 205,
210 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
153. See United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 76 (9th Cir. 1968).
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of demonstrating inability to obtain, by other means, information
which is already known by the party seeking discovery. Instead,
it is reasonable to conclude that the party seeking discovery must
show that he has a lack of information on a general matter at
issue.'51
Another issue raised by the new provisions relating to discovery
against a nonwitness expert is whether the names of experts specially retained in preparation of trial, but not expected to be
called as witnesses, may be discovered without a showing of
''exceptional circumstances." The rule makes no provision for the
discovery of their names. One view is that the identity of an
expert is discoverable only upon the requisite showing of the
''exceptional circumstances" needed to discover their opinions or
facts acquired in the preparation of the litigation.'55 A second
view is that a showing of exceptional circumstances is not required to discover the identity of an expert.
One court has taken the second view by relying on language in
subdivision (b)(1) of federal Rule 26 which requires the disclosure
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. 5 ' An
argument could be made, however, that nonwitness experts do
not have knowledge of "discoverable" matter unless a showing of
exceptional circumstances is made, and therefore their identity
need not be disclosed until such a showing is made.
Another court adopted the second view in Sea Colony, Inc. v.
Continental Insurance Co.'57 The court in Sea Colony reasoned
that establishing the identity of the expert is the first step in
discovering the existence of the expert's reports. ' Furthermore,
the court reasoned, a showing of exceptional circumstances is not
needed to discover the mere identity of the expert because the
rule is stated in terms of "facts or opinions" of the expert, not his
"identity."' 59
If there is truth to the premise that the identity of the retained
nonwitness expert is a helpful first step in showing the
''exceptional circumstances" under which his facts or opinions
may be discovered, then the analysis of Sea Colony has merit.

A.

154. See Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 18 (N.D. Ill. 1972); 8 C. WRIGHT &
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2032, at 256 (1970).
155. See Perry v. W.S. Darley & Co., 54 F.R.D. 278, 280 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
156. See Baki v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179, 181-82 (D. Md. 1976).
157. 63 F.R.D. 113 (D. Del. 1974).
158. Id. at 114.
159. Id.
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The validity of the premise, however, is questionable. The showing of "exceptional circumstances" required by the rule probably
does not require a showing that the particular facts or opinions
of an expert cannot be obtained by other means. Instead, it probably requires that the party cannot obtain, by other means, facts
or opinions about a matter in issue.'6 0 For example, the party
should not have to show inability to obtain the specific statistical
calculations of an adversary expert; he should only have to show
that he cannot locate any other experts capable of performing the
same calculations. The identity of the nonwitness expert is helpful in making the former showing, but not the latter. Identity of
the nonwitness expert would therefore appear to be important
dnly after the party shows his inability to obtain information on
matters at issue by other means-a showing of "exceptional circumstances."
The court in Sea Colony may also have been misguided in
stating that the rule only relates to "facts or opinions" of the
expert and not his identity. Although Rule 26.02(4) sets forth
requirements of the discovery of "facts and opinions" held by
experts, subdivision A of that rule also requires the disclosure of
an expert's identity if the expert is expected to be a witness.
Thus, it cannot be said that Rule 26.02(4) deals only with the
"facts or opinions" of experts. Furthermore, the mandatory disclosure of an expert's identity expressed only in subdivision A,
relating to expert trial witnesses, negatively implies that the disclosure is not mandatory in subdivision B relating to specially
retained experts not expected to be a witness.
There are two other reasons for not allowing discovery of the
identity of such experts until "exceptional circumstances" have
been shown. First, a requirement of exceptional circumstances is
in apparent accord with the comments to the federal rule.'6 ' Second, any duty to disclose the identity of the expert would probably involve an issue of whether he was a discoverable expert specially retained or employed as distinguished from a nondiscoverable expert informally consulted. The court could determine in
160. See notes 153-54 supra and accompanying text.
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B), Notes of Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment,
reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 161 (West 1972), states that "a party may on a proper showing
require the other party to name experts retained or specially employed ....
" Although
it is not perfectly clear what is meant by "proper showing," 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2032, at 255 n.81 (1970), the expression probably refers
to the showing of "exceptional circumstances" under Rule 26(b)(4)(B).
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the same proceeding both this issue and the issue of whether
''exceptional circumstances" have been shown.
All of these considerations seem to indicate that the better rule
is to require a disclosure of the identity of a specially retained
expert, not expected to be a witness, only upon a showing of
''exceptional circumstances."
Discovery is allowed against a nonwitness expert only if he is
"retained or specially employed."'' 2 Discovery is not allowed if he
merely has been informally consulted.' 3 Determination of
whether an expert has been retained or "specially employed"
presents some difficulty. The Federal Advisory Committee implied that an expert employee of a party who is a regular general
employee and who has been specially assigned to the case is one
who is "specially employed."' 64
One federal district court, however, has given a different interpretation to the term "specially employed." That court drew a
distinction between the expert who is already an employee of a
party and who has been assigned to work on the litigation, and
the expert who has been put on the payroll for the specific purpose of assisting in trial preparation.' The first type of employee
is not "specially employed," and therefore is the subject of discovery to the same extent as an ordinary witness. 66 Thus, house
experts are to be treated as ordinary witnesses. The second type
of employee is "specially employed" and thus subject to qualified
discovery.6 7
C.

Protective Orders

The new rules continue the availability of protective orders to
protect a party from oppression, undue burden, or expense in
162. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(4)(B) (1977).
163. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B), Notes of Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment,
reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 161 (West 1972).
164. "Subdivision (b)(4)(B) [MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(4)(B)] deals with an expert who
has been retained or specially employed by the party in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial (thus excluding an expert who is simply a general employee of the
party not specially employed on the case) ..
" FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B), Notes of
Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment (emphasis added), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 161
(West 1972).
165. See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D.
397, 407 (E.D. Va. 1975).
166. Id. at 407-08.
167. Id. at 407.
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connection with discovery."' The 1975 amendments, however,
contain three changes relating to protective orders. First, by placing the provisions for protective orders in Rule 26, they are now
available for any of the discovery devices. Under the old rules,
they were only available for oral depositions.' The second change
is an addition describing the courts from which the protective
orders may be obtained. Protective orders may now be obtained
from the court in which the suit is pending, or in the case of
depositions, from either that court or the court in the district
where the deposition is to be taken. 70 Third, the protections afforded by the rule have been slightly enlarged. Rule 26 now specifically provides that trade secrets may be protected 7 ' and that
both the time and place of discovery may be designated by the
court.'72 A motion for a protective order should be made when a
party objects to discovery and therefore fails to appear at his
deposition, respond to Rule 33 interrogatories, or respond to Rule
34 requests for the production of documents.' If a motion is not
made, the grounds for objection may be waived.' If a motion for
168. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 30.02, 278 Minn. at app. 39 (1968) with MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.03
(1977). Courts have issued protective orders for a variety of purposes. See United States
v. Illinois Fair Plan Ass'n, 67 F.R.D. 659, 661 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (protect confidentiality of
information); Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(protect privacy). But see Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975)
(allegation of repetitious discovery not sufficient for protective order).
The court may award expenses and fees against a party losing the motion for protection.
MINN. R. Ctv. P. 37.01(4) (1977).
169. Dist. Ct. R. 30.02, 278 Minn. at app. 39 (1968).
170. MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.03 (1977).
171. The rule merely restates existing Minnesota case law. Under Dist. Ct. R. 30.02,
278 Minn. at app. 39 (1968), a protective order could be obtained to prevent disclosure of
"secret processes, developments or research ....
" In Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246
Minn. 496, 510, 75 N.W.2d 762, 771 (1956) (dictum), the Minnesota Supreme Court said
that trade secrets would not be protected if they contain relevant evidence essential to a
fair adjudication of an issue. In addition, a party seeking protection of a trade secret must
be acting in good faith and not merely using a claim of trade secret to avoid legitimate
discovery. Thermorama, Inc. v. Shiller, 271 Minn. 79, 86, 135 N.W.2d 43, 47-48 (1965).
The court has broad discretion in forming the type of protection to be given a trade
secret. Therefore, the manner of protection varies with each case. Some of the more
frequently employed methods of protection include inspecting the information in camera
to determine confidentiality, e.g., Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 370 F.
Supp. 597 (D.N.J.), afl'd, 497 F.2d 394 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974), limiting
the persons to whom the information must be disclosed, e.g., Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Sunbeam
Corp., 61 F.R.D. 598, 602 (D. Del. 1973), and requiring disclosure of the ingredients of a
product but not the ratios in which they are combined, e.g., Sandee Mfg. Co. v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 24 F.R.D. 53, 58 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
172. MINN. R. Ctv. P. 26.03 (1977).
173. Id. 37.04.
174. See id.
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protection is lost, the court may award expenses and fees against
the losing party 7 5 as well as order discovery. 7 '
D.

Sequence, Timing, and Frequency of Discovery

Rule 26 now specifically provides for the sequence, timing, and
frequency of discovery. Subject to order of court and the time
limitations placed upon plaintiff for taking depositions, discovery
procedures begun by one party will no longer take priority over
those subsequently initiated by another party.'77 Discovery devices may be used in any sequence.' When a conflict arises, for
example, in the taking of depositions, the attorneys in most instances will be able to resolve it informally without court intervention. Finally, no limitation is placed on the frequency of discovery procedures, except on the number of interrogatories that
may be submitted under Rule 33179 and subject to the terms of a
175. See id. 37.01(4).
176. Failure to comply with the order will, of course, allow the imposition of Rule 37
sanctions. See id. 37.02(2).
177. Old Rule 26.01 had the effect of allowing the defendant to obtain priority in the
taking of depositions because the defendant could serve notice of a deposition anytime
after commencement of the action, whereas plaintiff could not serve notice of a deposition
within the first 20 days after commencement of the action unless leave of court was
obtained. In addition, some courts gave continuing priority to the first party to serve a
notice of deposition. See, e.g., Story v. Quarterback Sports Fed'n, 46 F.R.D. 432, 433 (D.
Minn. 1969); Schilling-Hillier S.A. Indus. E. Comercial v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp.,
19 F.R.D. 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Where special circumstances existed, however, this
rule was not strictly applied. E.g., Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Publishing
Co., 11 F.R.D. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (parties ordered to alternate taking of depositions
when duration of discovery is likely to be lengthy); Stover v. Universal Moulded Prod.
Corp., 11 F.R.D. 90, 91-92 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (plaintiff given priority if defendant's prior
notice is invalid).
The priority rule was criticized because it could be misused and thereby cause injustice
to the party lacking priority. Comment, Discovery PriorityRule Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure-Friendor Foe?, 74 DICK. L. REv. 103, 111-14 (1969). One such case is
First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 261-63 (1968), in which the plaintiff
was not permitted to have any kind of discovery until defendants finished taking depositions more than five years after the action had commenced.
New Rule 26.04 eliminated the priority rule. See MINN. R. Ctv. P. 26.04, Advisory
Comm. Note-1975. In addition, new Rule 30.01 eliminated the ability of the defendant
to serve the first notice of deposition. It requires court approval for the plaintiffs taking
of a deposition within 30 days after service of the summons and complaint but does not
limit plaintiff's service of mere notice. Therefore, priority will not exist under the new rules
unless the court orders it for the convenience of the parties and witnesses or in the interests
of justice, see MiNN. R. Civ. P. 26.04, Advisory Comm. Note-1975, or the parties stipulate
to it, MINN. R. Crv. P. 29 (1977).
178. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.04 (1977).
179. MINN. R. Civ. P. 33.01(1) (1977) continues to impose a limit of 50 interrogatories
served upon another party.
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protective order obtained to relieve a party from oppressive discovery.'
E.

The Continuing Duty to Supplement Discovery Responses

The old rules contained no requirement for supplemental responses to depositions, interrogatories, and requests for admission or inspection when new information was obtained. Minnesota case law, however, imposed a continuing duty to supplement
interrogatory answers.' Under new Rule 26, supplemental responses by a party are required only in specified instances.'
First, there is a continuing duty to disclose the identity of trial
witnesses, including expert trial witnesses, and the substance of
their testimony.' Second, a response must be corrected if it was
either incorrect when made, or has since become incorrect so that
nondisclosure would amount to a knowing concealment of the
true facts.8 4 Third, supplemental responses are required in compliance with an order of court, agreement of the parties, or new
requests by a party for supplementation of responses. l8
Rule 37 sanctions are probably not available if a party fails to
provide a required supplemental response because it is not one of
the types of flagrant misconduct listed in Rule 37.04.81 Instead,
the court is given wide discretion to determine any sanctions,8
such as exclusion of evidence or continuance. 8 The Minnesota
Supreme Court has indicated that sanctions will vary depending
on-whether or not the failure to supplement a response was willful.18 9
180.
181.
182.
183.

See id. 26.03.
See Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki, 265 Minn. 471, 477, 122 N.W.2d 110, 114 (1963).
See MINN. R. Cry. P. 26.05 (1977).
Id.

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 8 C. WRIGHT & A.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2050, at 325 (1970).

187. See Price v. Lake Sales Supply R.M. Inc., 510 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1974). See
generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2050 (1970).
188. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e), Notes of Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment, reprinted
in 28 U.S.C.A. 163-64 (West 1972).
189. In Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki, 265 Minn. 471, 478-79, 122 N.W.2d 110, 115 (1963),
the court said:
The object of sanctions should be to prevent the party who fails to comply with
the rule from profiting by his own violation. In cases where there is an honest
mistake and the harm can be undone, it may frequently occur that a continuance or some other remedy would be adequate but, where the violation is willful
and the party guilty of the violation seeks to take advantage of it at a time when
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An issue raised by these provisions is whether there is a duty
to disclose subsequently acquired information which merely adds
to a previous truthful answer. Prior to adoption of the new rules,
Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki'9 ° imposed a duty to disclose afteracquired information in two situations. First, it had to be disclosed when it rendered the original answers untruthful, unreliable, or inaccurate.' 9 ' Second, after-acquired information had to be
disclosed if it was of a material nature.'92 New Rule 26.05(2) codifies the first situation. The second situation is not contained in
new Rule 26, except to the extent that it relates to the continuing
duty of identifying either an expert witness who is expected to be
called at trial or a person with discoverable information.' Arguably, therefore, a party need not disclose material information
which merely adds to a previous answer.
There is, however, a countervailing argument that Gebhard,
rather than Rule 26.05, applies in situations where a party subsequently acquires material information which merely adds to a
previous truthful answer. Rule 26.05 provides that "[a] party
who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that
was complete when made is under no duty to supplement his
response to include information thereafter acquired, except as
follows . . . ."I" If the initial response was not complete when
made, Rule 26.05 should not be applicable. It is therefore critical
to determine the meaning of the clause "complete when made."
The clause could refer to completeness in the sense of being exhaustive of the party's knowledge at the time of the initial answer, or it could refer to completeness in the sense of being exhaustive of information actually in existence whether known by
the party or not. If the clause has the former meaning, a party
has given a complete answer unless he willfully or inadvertently
concealed some of his knowledge when he gave the initial response. If the clause has the latter meaning, a party who does not
provide material information in his initial response which was
the harm cannot be undone, suppression of the evidence may very well be the
proper and only available remedy.
Accord, Krech v. Erdman, Minn .....
233 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1975) (quoting
Gebhard).
190. 265 Minn. 471, 122 N.W.2d 110 (1963).
191. Id. at 477, 122 N.W.2d at 114.
192. Id.
193. See MINN. R. CIv. P. 26.05(1) (1977).
194. Id. 26.05 (emphasis added).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol3/iss1/2

30

Danforth: The 1975 Amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Discovery
19771

DISCOVERY RULES

actually in existence at that time has given an "incomplete"
answer. Thus, under the latter construction, Rule 26.05 is not
applicable in the situation where a party fails to provide existing
but unknown material information in his initial response, and
Gebhard could remain good law without being repugnant to Rule
26.05.
Notwithstanding this argument, Gebhard should no longer be
the law in Minnesota. First, the new rules of discovery were
meant to be a clarification of discovery requirements and not an
adjunct to prior case law.19 5 Second, the duty of making supplemental responses was meant to be reduced, not enlarged, by the
new rules.'
IV.

RULE

30:

DEPOSITIONS UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

Rule 30 contains the specific provisions governing depositions
of a party or witness on oral examination.'97 Although many of its
provisions were taken from the old rules, several important
changes have been made. These changes have been made in the
rules governing the timing of depositions, notice of examination,
examination, recording of depositions, and procedural matters
after the deposition.
A.

Timing of Depositions

An oral deposition may be taken any time after commencement
of the action. 9 8 The plaintiff, however, is required to obtain leave
of court if the deposition is to be taken within thirty days from
the service of process' unless the defendant has initiated discov195. The Minnesota Advisory Committee stated:
Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki, 265 Minn. 471, 122 N.W.2d 110 (1963), and case law
in other jurisdictions, impose a continuing obligation to respond upon a party
under Rule 33. The proposed new Rule 26.05 clarifies the practice and makes
explicit the obligation to provide new information in the specified situations.
There is no duty to supplement the responses except as provided in the rule.
MINN. R. Cirv. P. 26.05, Advisory Comm. Note-1975 (emphasis added).
196. The Minnesota Advisory Committee stated:
The proposed changes are designed to encourage discovery with a minimum of
court intervention. Among these are the following:

MINN.

197.
Minn.
198.
199.

(3) The duty to supplement responses would be eliminated except
in certain specified situations.
R. Civ. P., Advisory Comm. Note-1975, Introduction.
These provisions were derived from old Rule 26. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 26, 278
at app. 32-35 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P. 30 (1977).
MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.01 (1977).
Id.
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ery in any form or the defendant will be unavailable for examination within the state after the expiration of the thirty days and
the plaintiff so states with supportive facts in the notice of the
deposition. 00 The old rule required leave of court if the deposition
was to be taken within twenty days from commencement of the
action rather than from service of process.2 1' Because the new rule
addresses the taking of depositions and not the notification of
depositions, 02 the plaintiff may give notice within the thirty-day
period of a deposition to be taken after the thirty-day period
without leave of court.203 In addition, the required leave of court
may be obtained ex parte,20° unless it is an order to change the
time of taking the deposition.0 ' But even if leave of court is unnecessary because of the time at which the deposition is taken,
court intervention may be desired or required because of other
considerations. First, a deposition taken by plaintiff within thirty
days after service of process may not be used against a party at
200. Id. 30.02(2). The 30-day limitation is applicable to the deposition of a nonparty
as well as a party. It is true that the hardship of a deponent in preparing for a deposition
is usually not so great in the case of a nonparty as it is for a defendant. Yet, application
of the 30-day limitation to both parties and nonparties is sound because the limitation
protects defendants by affording them sufficient time to prepare for cross-examination of
a nonparty deponent. See 1 J. HETLAND & 0. ADAMSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE 689 (1970)
(authors' comment to old Rule 26.01).
201. See Dist. Ct. R. 26.01, 278 Minn. at app. 32 (1968). An action is commenced when
the summons is served or delivered to a proper officer for service. MINN. R. CIv. P. 3.01.
If the summons is delivered to a proper officer for service, the running of the old 20-day
limitation commenced at that time and could possibly expire by the time the defendant
actually received the summons. In that situation, the defendant would then have the
burden of obtaining a protective order. See, e.g., Westerman v. Grow, 198 F. Supp. 309
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); 1 J. HETLAND & 0. ADAMSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE 689 (1970) (authors'
comment to old Rule 26.01). To avoid this hardship, the rule was amended to measure
the period from the time process is served upon the defendant. If service is by publication,
the 30-day period is measured from 21 days after the first publication because that is when
"[tihe service of the summons shall be deemed complete." MiNN. R. Civ. P. 4.04.
202. MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.01, Advisory Comm. Note-1975.
203. Because the purpose of the required leave of court is to protect "a defendant who
has not had an opportunity to retain counsel and inform himself as to the nature of the
suit," FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a), Notes of Advisory Comm.-1946 Amendment, reprinted in
28 U.S.C.A. 153 (West 1972), the protection which is to be afforded the defendant should
not be against mere notice of the taking of a deposition but rather should be against the
taking of a deposition. Furthermore, restrictions on the timing of a plaintiffs notice of
taking a deposition were eliminated to prevent the defendant from obtaining priority in
the taking of depositions. See note 177 supra.
204. MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.01 (1977). The court might, however, require notice whenever
it is feasible. See K.J. Schwartzbaum, Inc. v. Evans, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
205. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.02(3), Advisory Comm. Note-1975.
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trial who can show that he was unable to obtain counsel to represent him at the deposition. ' Second, a court order or showing of
need may be required under Rule 26 to depose a nonmedical
expert witness °7 or under Rule 35 to depose a medical expert. '
The 1975 amendments left unanswered the question of whether
a third-party plaintiff must obtain leave of court for the taking
of a deposition within thirty days after service of the third-party
complaint. This question would probably be answered in the negative because of practical considerations and because such a limitation would not exist if defendant did not institute a third-party
action. 09
The rule also leaves unanswered the question of whether the
deponent's contemplated return to the state sometime after the
thirty-day period should affect the plaintiff's ability to take the
deposition within the thirty-day period without leave of court.
This situation would exist if the deponent was about to leave the
state within the thirty-day period but would return, for example,
206. MINN. R. Cw. P. 30.02(2) (1977).
207. Expert adverse trial witnesses may be deposed only pursuant to order of court, with
restrictions on the scope of discovery and such provisions for award of expenses and fees
as the court deems appropriate. Id. 26.02(4)(A)(ii). Experts specially employed by a party
in preparation for trial but who will not be trial witnesses may not be deposed except upon
a showing that it is impractical to obtain the information sought from them by other
means. Id. 26.02(4)(B). See notes 149-51 supra and accompanying text.
208. Medical experts who have examined an adverse party under Rule 35 may be
deposed without order of court. MINN. R. Cw. P. 35.02(2) (1977). If the medical privilege
has been waived, either by requesting the report of an adverse medical examination or by
deposing the examiner, id. 35.01, or by putting in issue a party's physical condition, id.
35.03, depositions of treating or examining medical experts may otherwise be taken only
upon a showing of good cause, id. 35.04.
209. One commentator has argued the limitation should not be applicable because "it
would unduly complicate matters if all taking of depositions were to be suspended every
time a new party was brought into a suit." 4A MooRE's FEERAL PRACTICE 30.53[3], at
30-58.1 (2d ed. 1975). Perhaps a better reason is stated in 1 J. HE.LAND & 0. ADAMSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE

689-90 (1970) (authors' comment to old Rule 26). It states:

[Slince the third party plaintiff as a defendant in the original action could
properly take the deposition of the potential third party defendant at any time
before commencing the third party action without regard to the 20 day prohibition, since the depositions of other parties pertaining to main action matters
may or may not involve third party defendant, and since plaintiff in the original
action may appropriately take depositions and generally is not a plaintiff for
purposes of relationship with a third party defendant, it would appear wise to
require a third party defendant to use [protective orders] in those situations
where protection is needed and additional time is required for preparation of
third party defendant as a party rather than to establish a blanket 20 day
prohibition each time a new claim is asserted against a new party.
Id. at 690.
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six months later. If Rule 30 is followed literally, the plaintiff will
be unable to take the deposition without obtaining leave of court
because the deponent will be available for examination within the
state after thirty days. Obviously, Rule 30 cannot be given such
a narrow construction because it would effectively prevent the
plaintiff from deposing a person who left the state shortly before
expiration of the thirty-day period but who planned to return
after trial.2" ' The best construction which could be given the Rule
30 language is probably that the plaintiff should be allowed to
depose, without leave of court, a person who the plaintiff has
reason to believe will leave the state prior to expiration of the
thirty-day period and reason to believe will not return to the state
before trial and in time for the plaintiff to ascertain relevant facts
and information held by the deponent.2 "1In addition, the notice
to the deponent should set forth facts in support of the beliefs and
212
be certified by the plaintiffs attorney.
If the plaintiff is incorrect as to his belief of the deponent's
unavailability, the deponent could then merely seek to have the
time lengthened by the court.2 3 Even if the defendant is not the
deponent, the defendant should similarly be entitled to have the
time lengthened because one of the purposes of the thirty-day
limitation is to enable the defendant to prepare for cross21
examination.
B.

Notice of Examination

Rule 30 continues the practice of initiating the taking of a
deposition by service of a reasonable written notice containing the
210. See Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki, 265 Minn. 471, 476, 122 N.W.2d 110, 114 (1963)
(construction of discovery rules which would prevent a party from preparing for a trial
should be avoided).
211. An objective standard, which would require plaintiff to show the deponent is about
to leave the state and not return in time for trial, cannot be implemented as a practical
matter because an action is not usually placed on the trial calendar until well after the
30-day period. Thus, the showing which plaintiff must make should be based on his
subjective beliefs as to the deponent's availability rather than objective facts. The subjective standard also furthers the purpose of discovery, which is to eliminate the element of
surprise and allow each party to ascertain all relevant facts and information prior to trial.
See Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki, 265 Minn. 471, 476-77, 122 N.W.2d 110, 114-15 (1963);
Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 560, 68 N.W.2d 649, 656-57 (1955).
212. MINN. R. CIv. P. 30.02(2) (1977).
213. See id. 30.02(3).
214. See 1 J. HE'LAND & 0. ADAMsON, MINNESOTA PRACTME 689 (1970) (authors' comment to old Rule 26.01).
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details required by the rule.215 If a party is to be examined, mere
notice is sufficient to compel attendance."' If the deponent is not
a party, he must be subpoenaed. 1 ' If the deposition is to be taken
within thirty days after the service of process without order of
court, the notice should contain the statement that the deponent
will be unavailable in the state after the thirty-day period and
should set forth facts to support the statement. 1 '
The notice should designate any materials required to be pro21
duced by a nonparty witness under a subpoena duces tecum.

1

If

the deponent is a party, the notice should include a request for
production of specified documents or things in compliance with
the requirements and procedures of Rule 34.20 Professors Wright
and Miller have criticized the different procedural treatment of
parties and nonparties in the production of documents at a deposition because a nonparty served with a subpoena duces tecum
under Rule 45 must object within ten days after service whereas
a party served with a request for the production of documents
under Rule 34 has at least thirty days in which to respond.22 1 They

conclude that the Rule 34 time period should be disregarded in a
request for documents used in conjunction with a Rule 30 deposi.
tion 122
This argument seems to overlook the fact that a duty to produce documents imposes the same hardship on a party whether
required in conjunction with a deposition or required as an independent means of discovery. It must be assumed that the thirty215. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.02(1) (1977).
216. See id. 30.02(1), See also Juster v. Grossman, 229 Minn. 280, 283-87, 38 N.W.2d
832, 834-36 (1949) (court has no jurisdiction to restrain taking of a deposition when proper
notice is served).
217. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.01 (1977). Rule 45 sets forth the provisions governing
subpoenas.
218. Id. 30.02(2).
219. Id.30.02(1).
220. Id. 30.02(5).
221. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PaOCEDURE § 2108, at 395-96
(1970).
222. Charles Wright and Allen Miller state:
It makes no sense at all to build such a long delay into the procedure as against
a party while allowing expeditious proceedings against a nonparty. The only way
to avoid such an unappealing result is to say that the procedural provisions of
Rule 34 other than the time periods there set out apply to a request under Rule
30(b)(5) . . . . This is what the law ought to be, and it seems to be what the
Advisory Committee intended, but unfortunately it flies in the teeth of the
language of the rule.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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day response period was intended if a Rule 34 request is made
independent of any other forms of discovery. The same time period should also be available if the party seeking discovery decides to use Rule 34 in conjunction with a deposition. To hold
otherwise and follow the suggestion of Wright and Miller would
allow a party requesting production of a document to circumvent
the thirty-day response period by merely requesting the document in conjunction with a deposition that could, as a tactical
matter, consist of merely one question.
A final change made in Rule 30 provisions governing notice of
examination is found in a new procedure whereby a party or
nonparty corporation or other organization may be named as a
witness in the deposition notice and subpoena. 3 The new procedure does not, however, prevent a party from designating specific
individual officers or agents. If the corporation or organization is
named in the deposition, it must then designate a director, officer, managing agent, or other person to testify on its behalf upon
the matters set forth in the notice and subpoena. If a corporation
or organization fails to designate a deponent, a motion for an
order compelling such designation is available under Rule 37.224
Disobedience of the order may result in the imposition of sanctions.225
Persons other than officers, directors, or managing agents may
be so designated only with their consent. This permits an agent
or employee who has a conflicting or independent interest in the
lawsuit-such as a personal injury action-to refuse to testifyY5
The person designated must testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the organization. 2 2
223. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.02(6) (1977).
224. See id. 37.01(2).
225. See id. 37.02(2).
226. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), Notes of Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment, reprinted
in 28 U.S.C.A. 245 (West 1972).
227. MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.02(6) (1977). Although the rules were not clear, it was generally
understood that prior to the 1975 amendments the party seeking discovery had the duty
to name the officer or agent who was to testify on behalf of the corporation. See 2 J.
HETLAND & 0. ADAMSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE 5 (1970) (authors' comment to old Rule 30).
There are no Minnesota decisions on the Minnesota rule, but under the old federal rules
a party seeking discovery could not continue the examination with a different officer when
the officer or agent named could not give the information, unless notice was given to the
different officer. See Harry Von Tilzer Music Pub. Co. v. Leo Feist, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 96
(S.D.N.Y. 1941). This result is changed by the new rules because Rule 30.02(6) places the
burden on the corporation to designate an officer, agent or other person who "shall testify
as to matters known or reasonably available to the organization" (emphasis added). The
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C. Examinationand Objections
Rule 30 continues the provisions of the old rules 28 that deponents shall be examined and cross-examined under Rule 43 governing examination and cross-examination at trial. 29 The scope
of examination at a deposition is governed generally by Rule 26230
subject to such limitations as the court may impose when the
deposition of an expert trial witness is taken2 a1232or when a protective order to limit the examination is sought.

New Rule 30 continues the requirements that all objections
made at the deposition shall be noted on the record, and evidence
objected to shall be taken subject to the objection2 33 unless a
motion is made to the court to limit the scope of the examination23 4 or to compel an answer from a witness who refuses to answer a question or questions. 235 Failure to make an objection may
implication is that if the person designated by the corporation does not have knowledge
as to information requested by the party seeking discovery but the information is reasonably available to the organization, the organization has the duty to provide the information
either by educating the person originally designated or by re-designating a person having
knowledge of such information.
In this regard, the meaning of the duty to testify on matters "reasonably available to
the organization" is unclear. This could mean that the organization must provide information both which it has and which it does not have but which is reasonably available from
outside sources, or it could mean that the organization must provide only that information
which it already has and which is reasonably available for disclosure in the deposition.
The latter construction is more reasonable. A meaningful analogy can be made between
an organization's duty under Rule 30 to provide testimony on matters reasonably available
to it and an organization's duty to present requested documents under Rule 34. An organization has no personal knowledge; any information is either in the minds of its members
or in tangible forms such as writings. The duty of the designated person to testify on
"matters known" relates to the former type of information; the duty to testify on matters
"reasonably available to the organization" relates to the latter type of knowledge reduced
to tangible form. Thus the organization must provide testimony on matters in tangible
form which are reasonably available to it. It would be an anomaly if an organization had
a duty under Rule 30 to obtain information in tangible form which the organization does
not have but which is reasonably available from outside sources, because under Rule 34
the organization would have a duty to produce written documents or tangible things only
if "in the possession, custody or control of the organization."
228. Dist. Ct. R. 26.03, 278 Minn. at app. 33 (1968).
229. See MINN. R. Ctv. P. 30.03 (1977).
230. See id. 26.02.
231. See id. 26.02(4)(A)(ii).
232. See id. 30.04.
233. Id. 30.03.
234. See id. 30.04.
235. See id. 37.01(2). If the witness is a party, a motion for an order compelling an
answer to a question or questions at the deposition may be made to the court in the district
in which the action is pending or to the court in the county in which the deposition is being
taken. Id. 37.01(1).
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result in its being waived.2 3 This includes objections to the qualification of the officer before whom the deposition is taken.27
Objections may be an insufficient deterrent in some instances
to prevent improper questioning. Rule 30 continues the old provisions for a motion to limit examination by terminating the deposition or limiting the scope or manner of the examination 38 by the
court in which the action is pending or by the court in the district
where the deposition is being taken.2 3 The moving party must
show that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in
a manner which is unreasonably annoying, embarrassing, or oppressive. A new provision is added, however, whereby the court
may impose expenses and fees against the moving or opposing
party or his attorney, depending on the "substantial justifica2 °
tion" for the motion or the opposition to it. 1
D.

Recording of Depositions

Unless otherwise ordered by the court, testimony at a deposition is recorded stenographically.2 4 ' Upon the request of a party,
the court may order that the testimony be recorded by mechanical, electronic, or photographic means with adequate safeguards. 2 2 This order does not, however, prevent the other party
from having the deposition stenographically transcribed at his
own expense.2 43 A final change is that unlike the former rule,
testimony will be transcribed only if one of the parties requests
it.244
Failure to obey an order of the court located in the county in which the deposition is
taken may be considered a contempt. Id. 37.02(1). Failure to obey an order of the court
in which the action is pending may result in the imposition of other sanctions. See id.
37.02(2).
236. See note 39 supra.
237. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 32.04(2) (1977). Although the rules contain no specific provision for hearing an objection to the qualifications of the officer, this objection can be heard
before trial if the deponent refuses to answer, thereby requiring the party who asked the
question to obtain an order compelling an answer under Rule 37. Otherwise, the objection
will be heard at trial along with any other objections to the deposition.
238. Limitations on the scope or manner of the examination are set forth in the provisions for protective orders under MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.03 (1977),
239. See id. 30.04.
240. See id. 37.01(4).
241. Id. 30.03.
242. Id. 30.02(4).
243. Id.
244. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 30.03, 278 Minn. at app. 39 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.03
(1977).
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The courts which have faced the issue of adequate safeguards
needed for nonstenographic recording have been virtually unanimous in requiring that the initiating party implement the nonstenographic recording,2 4 that the recording device be of high
quality and reproduce the deposition as accurately as a court
reporter,248 an original be filed with the court,247 identification of
the speaker be assured,24 and two independent recording devices
be used."
There are certain safeguards, however, which have been the
subject of dispute. One disputed safeguard is whether the recording device must be operated by an independent third party. Some
operator as a matter of
courts have required an independent
2
250
1'
not.
have
others
course whereas
The differing requirements of an independent operator stem
from various conclusions reached by the courts as they weigh the
need for accuracy and trustworthiness against the need for economy. Therefore, perhaps the best solution to this issue is to balance these interests on a case-by-case basis and not have a predetermined requirement of an independent operator. Two courts
have taken a similar position, requiring an independent operator
only when there are no other alternatives to guarantee trustworthiness. 512 Under the proposed case-by-case standard, the initiat245. See, e.g., Jarosiewicz v. Conlisk, 60 F.R.D. 121 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Wescott v. Neeman, 55 F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb. 1972).
246. See, e.g., Lucas v. Curran, 62 F.R.D. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Jarosiewicz v. Conlisk,
60 F.R.D. 121 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Marlboro Prod. Corp. v. North Am. Phillips Corp., 55
F.R.D. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 54 F.R.D. 610 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
247. See Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Lucas v. Curran,
62 F.R.D. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 54 F.R.D. 610 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
248. See Lucas v. Curran, 62 F.R.D. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (speakers required to identify
themselves whenever necessary for clarity of the record); Wescott v. Neeman, 55 F.R.D.
257 (D. Neb. 1972) (verbal identification by counsel at start of examination sufficient
unless a third person interjects; person who interjects must precede interjection with
words of identification); Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 54 F.R.D. 610 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (independent operator required to make a detailed log and index of the proceedings, including
identification of the attorneys and the witnesses).
249. See, e.g., Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (use of two
recorders is an alternative to requiring an independent operator); Lucas v. Curran, 62
F.R;D. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Wescott v. Neeman, 55 F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb. 1972).
250. See Jarosiewicz v. Conlisk, 60 F.R.D. 121 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Wescott v. Neeman, 55
F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb. 1972); Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 54 F.R.D. 610 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
251. See Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Lucas v. Curran,
62 F.R.D. 336 (E.D, Pa. 1974); Marlboro Prod. Corp. v. North Am. Phillips Corp., 55
F.R.D. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
252. See Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Marlboro Prod.
Corp. v. North Am. Phillips Corp., 55 F.R.D. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (court presumed mem-
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ing party at least should be required to demonstrate a cost saving
in not hiring an independent operator because all costs being
equal, the court should favor the more accurate and trustworthy
deposition recorded by an independent operator.
A related issue which has been the subject of dispute is whether
the calling party should be required to show that use of a nonstenographic recording will result in a cost-saving over use of a stenographic recording. This issue stems in part from the Federal Advisory Committee's comment that "[in order to facilitate less
expensive procedures, provision is made for the recording of testimony by other than stenographic means .... ",253 One court has
taken the position that if the initiating party cannot make a
showing of the cost-saving, the request for a nonstenographic recording is inimical to the only stated objective of the rule.2 54 Another court has taken the opposite position, stating that the inability of a particular party to pay for stenographically recorded
depositions is usually irrelevant because the express objective of
facilitating less expensive procedures is merely a declaration of
general policy.255 The latter position seems preferable, because
the former position places the wrong emphasis on the Federal
Advisory Committee comments. It is just as likely that the comments refer to the expected manner in which the rule would be
used rather than to the required manner of its use. That is, a
moving party will usually seek nonstenographic recording if it is
less expensive than stenographic recording, and therefore the rule
will "facilitate less expensive procedures." Certainly the court
should recognize that nonstenographic recordings may be desirable for reasons other than saving expenses. If the rule were merely
intended to be a cost-saving substitute for stenographically recorded depositions, the Federal Advisory Committee would not
have also used "photographic" procedures as an example of per25
missible procedures.
A final safeguard over which there has been dispute is the
necessity of maintaining a detailed log and index when the oral
bers of the bar will not alter tape recordings).
253. FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (b)(4), Notes of Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment, reprinted
in 28 U.S.C.A. 244 (West 1972).
254. See Perry v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 63 F.R.D. 603 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 516
(4th Cir. 1976).
255. See Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
256. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4), Notes of Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment,
reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 244 (West 1972).
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deposition is recorded on tape. One court has required a detailed
log and index to facilitate, during the taking of the deposition,
reference back to previously answered questions. 257 Another court
has stated that a detailed log and index is not required because
the recording will be subsequently transcribed.2 58 The conclusion
of the former court seems more reasonable than that of the latter
court. Whether the recording is to be transcribed subsequently is
irrelevant to a determination of whether the convenience of quick
reference back to a prior statement during the deposition justifies
the imposition of a duty to maintain a log and index. The better
rule is that maintenance of a log and index should be required as
part of the initiating party's burden of supplying the device for
nonstenographic recordation. This duty could be discharged either by an independent operator, if required, or by an employee
of the initiating party. If the initiating party fails to provide a
sufficient log and index to meet the demands for its use during
the deposition, the court could then impose additional safeguards.25
E.

ProceduralRequirements after the Deposition

Most of the procedural requirements imposed after the taking
of a deposition remain unchanged. Rule 30 continues the requirement that the officer certify and file the deposition.8 0 The party
taking the deposition is still required to give notice of the filing
to all other parties.2 1' Two significant changes, however, were
made with respect to procedural requirements imposed after the
taking of a deposition.
The first change relates to the signing of the deposition. As
before, a stenographic transcription of a deposition shall be submitted to the witness for examination unless waived by the witness and the parties.2 6 2 If the deposition is submitted to the witness, he shall sign it unless the need for his signature has been
waived by the parties. In addition, the new rule provides that if
257. See Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 54 F.R.D. 610, 614-15 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
258. See Lucas v. Curran, 62 F.R.D. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
259. Cf. Montgomery Mills, Inc. v. Griffen-Burgess Corp., 62 F.R.D. 105 (D. Del. 1974)
(additional safeguards to assure taping is subordinate to the conduct of the deposition and
is as innocuous as the taking of written notes).
260. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 30.06, 278 Minn. at app. 41 (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P.
30.06(1) (1977).
261. MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.06(3) (1977).
262. Id. 30.05.
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the deposition is not signed within thirty days from its submission
to the witness, the officer taking the deposition shall sign it.6
This additional requirement does not affect the use of the deposition.
A new provision has also been added to provide flexibility in
the handling of exhibits produced for inspection at the taking of
the deposition." 4 Upon the request of a party, documents and
other items produced for inspection at the deposition shall be
annexed to the deposition.265 For the safekeeping of original documents, the person producing the materials may substitute copies
of the originals with an opportunity for verification, or he may
request return of the original for an opportunity to inspect and
copy it. However, any party may move that the original document be annexed pending final disposition of the case."'
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has discussed the various changes in the new discovery rules and some of the unresolved issues which have been
created by the changes. Although some of the changes are significant, many will have little, if any, impact on the discovery practices which were used by Minnesota attorneys prior to the amendments. The most significant impact is on prior practices relating
to discovery through depositions and the discovery of work product and experts.
Some of the unresolved issues raised by the changes are also
significant, especially issues relating to the discovery of experts
and work product. In addition, the question of what safeguards
are needed in conjunction with depositions by electronic and photographic means will certainly become significant as such devices
become more popular. But even though new issues have been
created, the 1975 amendments to the discovery rules, as a whole,
represent a simplification and clarification of permissible discovery techniques.
263. See id.
264. Compare Dist. Ct. R. 30.06, 278 Minn. at app. 41, (1968) with MINN. R. Civ. P.
30.06(1) (1977).
265. MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.06(1) (1977). "As a general rule and in the absence of agreement to the contrary or order of the court, exhibits produced without objection are to be
annexed to and returned with the deposition ....
" FED. R. Civ. P. 30(f)(1), Notes of
Advisory Comm.-1970 Amendment, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 246 (West 1972). "If the
originals are to be annexed and retained with the deposition, a court order is appropriate
for such purpose." MINN. R. Civ. P. 36.06(1), Advisory Comm. Note-1975.
266. MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.06(1) (1977).
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